ΠΕΛΜΑ ΦΘΙΝΟΠΩΡΟ 2023 🌟 Ανακάλυψε Μοναδικά σχέδια στις καλύτερες τιμές!

Ενώπιον της απογοητευτικής μέχρι σήμερα προσαρμογής της, η Ελλάδα πρέπει να δεχτεί μια εκχώρηση της δημοσιονομικής της κυριαρχίας σε ένα ευρωπαϊκό κλιμάκιο για ένα ορισμένο χρονικό διάστημα

Η Ελλάδα θα μπορεί να ελέγχει μόνο τις λειτουργικές δαπάνες της κυβέρνησης, αφού πρώτα έχει εξυπηρετήσει το χρέος της.

Εάν ένας τέτοιος νόμος περάσει, γράφει η πρόταση, τότε οι αγορές και οι άλλοι πιστωτές θα μπορούν να σιγουρευτούν ότι στο μέλλον δεν θα επαναληφθεί η χρεοκοπία.

Εάν μία από τις δόσεις δεν εκταμιευθεί, η Ελλάδα δεν θα μπορεί να απειλεί τους δανειστές της με χρεοκοπία, αλλά αντιθέτως θα είναι υποχρεωμένη να αποδεχθεί περαιτέρω περικοπές δαπανών ως τη μόνη δυνατή αντίδραση σε μία ενδεχόμενη μη εκταμίευση

ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΟ ΤΟ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟ

I. Background  
According to information from the Troika, Greece has most likely missed key programme objectives
again in 2011. In particular, the budget deficit has not decreased compared to the previous year.
Therefore Greece will have to significantly improve programme compliance in the future to honour its
commitments to lenders. Otherwise the Eurozone will not be able to approve guarantees for GRC II.  
II. Proposal for the improvement of compliance
To improve compliance in the 2
nd
 programme, the new MoU will have to contain two innovative
institutional elements on which Greece will have to commit itself. They will become further prior
actions for the second programme. Only if and when they are implemented, the new programme can
commence:  
1. Absolute priority to debt service
Greece has to legally commit itself to giving absolute priority to future debt service. This commitment
has to be legally enshrined by the Greek Parliament. State revenues are to be used first and foremost
for debt service, only any remaining revenue may be used to finance primary expenditure. This will
reassure public and private creditors that the Hellenic Republic will honour its comittments after PSI
and will positively influence market access. De facto elimination of the possibility of a default would
make the threat of a non-disbursement of a GRC II tranche much more credible. If a future tranche is
not disbursed, Greece can not threaten its lenders with a default, but will instead have to accept further
cuts in primary expenditures as the only possible consequence of any non-disbursement.  
2. Transfer of national budgetary sovereignty
Budget consolidation has to be put under a strict steering and control system. Given the disappointing
compliance so far, Greece has to accept shifting budgetary sovereignty to the European level for a
certain period of time. A budget commissioner has to be appointed by the Eurogroup with the task of
ensuring budgetary control. He must have the power a) to implement a centralized reporting and
surveillance system covering all major blocks of expenditure in the Greek budget, b) to veto decisions
not in line with the budgetary targets set by the Troika and c) will be tasked to ensure compliance with
the above mentioned rule to prioritize debt service.
The new surveillance and institutional approach should be formulated in the MoU as follows: “In the
case of non-compliance, confirmed by the ECB, IMF and EU COM, a new budget commissioner
appointed by the Eurogroup would help implementing reforms. The commissioner will have broad
surveillance competences over public expenditure and a veto right against budget decisions not in line
with the set budgetary targets and the rule giving priority to debt service.” Greece has to ensure that
the new surveillance mechanism is fully enshrined in national law, preferably through constitutional
amendment